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 Dynamics of Resource Slack and Constraints: Resource Positions in Action 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies of the effects of resource slack and constraints on creativity and performance 
offer contradictory findings. To resolve this debate, some authors operationalize resource 
slack and constraints in ways that actually may have concealed their underlying complexity 
and dynamics. This study seeks to demonstrate how perceived resource positions influence 
entrepreneurial decision making and creativity by drawing on in-depth case studies of three 
high-tech start-ups. The authors show that resource positions are perceived, relative, transient 
and multidimensional; that is, they reflect the entrepreneur’s perception of available resources 
relative to demand. Moreover, perceived resource positions are not static but change over 
time, and entrepreneurs can experience different types of resource constraints and slack 
simultaneously. The influence of perceived resource positions on decision making in turn 
depends on individual, temporal and resource position dynamics. These findings link 
perceptions of resources to the emergence of organizational ingenuity, by explaining how 
perceived resource positions influence decision making. 
 
 
Keywords 
Resource slack, resource constraints, entrepreneurship, creativity, decision making 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Both new and established firms need resources for their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), 
growth (Penrose, 1959) and sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991); resource 
constraints instead hinder firm growth and lower the probability of survival (Becchetti & 
Trovato, 2002; Musso & Schiavo, 2008). However, such constraints also might foster 
creativity (Hoegl, Gibbert, & Mazursky, 2008; Moreau & Dahl, 2005) and force firms to deal 
with problems promptly (Bhide, 1992). Slack resources tend to improve firms’ financial 
performance (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004), buffer environmental shocks and 
allow for more discretion and flexibility in responding to competitor strategies (George, 
2005). Yet, large resource endowments also could hinder the entrepreneurial process by 
impairing firms’ ability to identify new business opportunities (Mosakowski, 2002). Thus, it 
is unclear when resource constraints or slack lead to organizational ingenuity—the ability to 
create innovative solutions within structural constraints using limited resources and 
imaginative problem solving (Lampel, Honig, & Drori, 2011). 
 Several scholars have attempted to resolve these contradictory potential outcomes of 
resource slack or constraints on creativity and performance, for example in terms of inverse 
U-shaped relationships and context dependent effects (Bradley, Wiklund, & Shepherd, 2011; 
Hoegl et al., 2008; Hvide & Møen, 2010). A relatively less explored explanation involves the 
underlying dynamics of resource constraints and slack (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) which remain 
concealed in cross-sectional studies that take the firm as the primary unit of analysis. If the 
entrepreneur’s perception of resource constraints and slack is likely to affect sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995) and entrepreneurial decision making, as suggested by the radical Austrian 
approach to entrepreneurship (e.g., Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 2007; Chiles, Vultee, Gupta, 
Greening, & Tuggle, 2010), then more objective, firm-level measures of constraints and slack 
cannot serve to identify the true underlying dynamics.  
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 Accordingly, this study considers the possibility that entrepreneurs perceive resource 
constraints or slack as transient positions relative to their start-up’s own resource demands 
(George, 2005; Renko, Reynolds, & Carsrud, 2010), at any given moment. We draw on 
insights from both sensemaking theory and the radical Austrian approach to explore how 
perceived, anticipated and relative resource positions influence entrepreneurial decision 
making. In turn, we study the influence of constraints and slack at the decision making, rather 
than overall firm, level—such that entrepreneurs experience different resource positions over 
time.  
 With in-depth event studies of how three high-tech start-ups develop over several 
years, this research makes three key contributions to the literature pertaining to the effects of 
resource slack and constraints on entrepreneurial decision making. First, by studying resource 
positions as perceived, anticipated and relative, we demonstrate that resource positions must 
be understood as transient and multidimensional. Slack and constraints cannot be investigated 
separately, at the firm level or with cross-sectional research designs, because such measures 
often lead to contradictory findings. By framing resource slack and constraints as two 
extremes of the spectrum of attainable resource positions, we thus integrate research on 
resource slack and resource constraints. Second, this study reveals how perceived resource 
positions influence decision-making processes in terms of individual, temporal and resource 
position dynamics. Third, we contribute to Austrian perspectives on entrepreneurship by 
empirically demonstrating how subjective perceptions of resource positions enter the 
decision-making process, in which entrepreneurs generate idiosyncratic options with varying 
degrees of creativity. These contributions advance understanding of the emergence of 
organizational ingenuity, by building theory on how constraints in a range of resource 
positions influence (creative) decision making by entrepreneurs (Lampel et al., 2011). 
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Theoretical background 
An entrepreneur’s resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, 
information and knowledge under his or her control that may serve to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness (Daft, 1983). We conceive of resource slack and resource constraints as the two 
extremes of a spectrum of attainable perceived resource positions. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
resource positions reflect perceived resource availability, which results from the set of actual 
or potential resources at one’s disposal (Bourgeois, 1981), relative to the perceived resource 
demand (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; George, 2005; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004). At 
one end of this spectrum, the entrepreneur experiences a shortage of resources because 
resource demand is greater than resource availability. At the other end, he or she enjoys an 
abundance of resources in excess of demand, or resource slack. 
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 
 
The effects of resource positions 
Resource positions have been linked to creativity, defined as the production of novel and 
useful ideas in any domain (Amabile, 1996), such that creative ideas differ from previously 
realized ideas. Accordingly, innovation is the successful implementation of creative ideas in 
an organization (Amabile, 1996). Existing studies of how resource positions influence 
decision making, creativity and innovation have produced mixed findings. Slack resources 
might fuel innovation, by promoting experimentation and risk taking (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Nohria & Gulati, 1996; O’Brien, 2003; Thompson, 1967). In this sense, substantial resource 
slack relaxes internal controls and allows firms to undertake multiple innovation projects 
while enabling the firm to survive, even if a project’s outcomes are unsuccessful (Agarwal, 
Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; Bradley, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; 
Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). However, firms with abundant resources may be less 
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inclined to experiment (George, 2005), because the routines they have established to exploit 
successful paths to market ultimately compromise their exploration of new ideas (Levinthal 
& March, 1993; Mishina et al., 2004). In contrast, resource constraints might foster creativity 
(Hoegl et al., 2008; Moreau & Dahl, 2005) and stimulate innovations that are more efficient, 
in terms of both time and money (Gibbert & Scranton, 2009; Hoegl, Weiss, & Gibbert, 2010). 
 Resource positions also influence how firms interact with their environment. Slack 
resources buffer firms against environmental shocks, stabilize the firm in times of distress 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Donaldson, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Van Dijk, Berends, 
Jelinek, Romme, & Weggeman, 2011) and provide freedom and flexibility to allow the firm 
to adapt to changing competitive environments (Levinthal, 1997; Thompson, 1967). These 
buffers also can mask underlying problems though, or result in overconfidence (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993; Ross & Staw, 1993). By isolating a firm from exogenous shocks, slack can 
promote managerial complacency, induce irrational optimism (George, 2005) and allow a 
firm to establish structural misfits with the environment (Litschert & Bonham, 1978). Instead, 
resource-constrained firms that experience the direct effects of environmental pressures 
instead are more likely to respond quickly and seek creative ways to overcome such pressures 
(Hoegl et al., 2008). 
 
Researching resource positions 
Various strategies have been applied in attempts to reconcile the conflicting findings arising 
from previous work on the implications of resource availability. For example, some studies 
propose a curvilinear relationship between available resources and firm performance (Hvide 
& Møen, 2010; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003; Zhou & Wu, 2010) or explore 
mediation effects (Bradley, Wiklund, et al., 2011; Hoegl et al., 2008). Others imply that the 
effects of resource constraints and slack are contingent on the context, such as the market or 
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competitive environment (Bradley, Shepherd, et al., 2011; Katila & Shane, 2005), perceived 
environmental threats (Voss et al., 2008), project and team characteristics (Hoegl et al., 2008) 
or recovery after an adverse event (De Carolis, Yang, Deeds, & Nelling, 2009). The actual 
effects of resource availability and operationalization of resource slack and constraints 
continue to be subject to controversy though (Bourgeois, 1981; Marino & Lange, 1983; 
Mishina et al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  
 Most studies operationalize resource slack and constraints at the firm level, using 
financial ratios (Greve, 2003) or measures that compare resource availability with industry 
averages as a proxy for resource demand (Bromiley, 1991; Daniel et al., 2004; George, 2005; 
Mishina et al., 2004). However, financial ratios often fail to reflect a firm’s resource 
availability or ability to invest accurately (Bottazzi, Secchi, & Tamagni, 2012; Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997, 2000; Musso & Schiavo, 2008), nor do these measures indicate the firm’s 
actual resource demand (George, 2005), which is problematic if slack or constraints depend 
on perceived resource demands (George, 2005; Mishina et al., 2004; Renko et al., 2010). In 
addition, the majority of studies in this area adopt a cross-sectional approach, measuring 
slack or constraints at a single point in time, such that they ignore changes over time 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Mishina et al., 2004; Moses, 1992) and possibly conceal the underlying 
dynamics (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) that might explain the mixed results obtained from 
previous studies.  
 
Dealing with resource constraints and resource slack 
Entrepreneurs have various ways to deal with a shortage or abundance of resources. When 
resources fall short of demand, entrepreneurs might seek to lower or eliminate resource 
demands (e.g., abandoning existing plans for growth); cope internally and continue to operate 
under constrained conditions, by making do with the resources at hand (Baker & Nelson, 
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2005); or alleviate constraints through external resource acquisition (Hoegl et al., 2008). 
Internal coping implies a selection among the effects that can be established with a given set 
of resources (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2008; Baker & Nelson, 
2005), whereas external resource acquisition generally relies on outside parties for the 
resources needed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Entrepreneurs may also seek to attract external 
financial capital to fund the procurement of additional resources. When information 
asymmetries between capital providers and entrepreneurs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1981) make this option expensive or unavailable, 
entrepreneurs search out different options, such as bootstrapping methods (Bhide, 1992).  
Bootstrapping methods aim to minimize capital requirements, optimize cash flows, and 
secure resources with less cost (Winborg & Landström, 2001; Winborg, 2009; Ebben, 2009; 
Ebben & Johnson, 2006). Other alternatives include reliance on social capital (Bouty, 2000; 
Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003), resource cooptation (Starr & 
MacMillan, 1990), or inter-firm joint resource usages (Winborg & Landström, 2001). By 
building networks of partnerships, entrepreneurs also might obtain resource commitments 
from early-stage stakeholders (Sarasvathy et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005).  
 In contrast, when entrepreneurs believe they have slack resources, they can redeploy 
them to various new uses, depending on the type of resources available, their accessibility 
(Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), ease of recoverability (Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986) and liquidity 
(Mishina et al., 2004; Penrose, 1959). The various types of resource slack include human 
resource (Mishina et al., 2004), financial (Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003), 
operational (Bourgeois, 1981) and customer relational (Voss et al., 2008) slack. 
Entrepreneurs also vary in the degree of managerial discretion or flexibility they have to 
(re)deploy slack resources (George, 2005; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & 
Tansik, 1988). Entrepreneurs thus can decide differently according to their resource 
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availability, involving various degrees of creativity, but it is not clear how resource positions 
influence their decisions. 
 
Perceived resource positions 
Research on sensemaking and subjectivity in entrepreneurship provides some insights into 
how entrepreneurs likely determine their resource positions, according to their past 
experiences and imagined futures. As Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) and Weick 
(1995) recognize, people act on the basis of the sense they make of the situation at hand. 
Entrepreneurs make such sense by creating an account, together with others, from an array of 
prior experiences, assessments of current conditions and of what can be done in the future 
(Weick, 1995). This account, which might manifest in an espoused strategy, also provides a 
means to convince others to engage and perhaps provide resources (Cornelissen & Clarke, 
2010). In a changing environment, sensemaking involves a continuous, dynamic practice to 
deal with new and adapted experiences. That is, to make sense of the world around them, 
entrepreneurs relate their perceived resource position to their (social) environment, past 
experiences, decisions and actions. When an entrepreneur perceives resource constraints,  
(s)he may determine that the situation demands making do with whatever resources are 
available (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Weick, 1993); another entrepreneur in the same situation 
might perceive some form of resource munificence and pursue firm growth strategies 
(Edelman & Yli-Renko, 2010). As Bourgeois (1981) notes, these resource perceptions 
include both existing and potential resources. Overall, the entrepreneur’s perceived resource 
position is highly subjective and temporary, so sensemaking processes determine how 
entrepreneurs choose a particular course of action.  
 The Austrian school of economics (see Jacobson, 1992; Kirzner, 1997) suggests that 
entrepreneurs’ subjective perceptions of their resources drive decision making. These 
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perceptions generate heterogeneity among entrepreneurs, often because they lack accurate 
data (Kirzner, 1997; Von Hayek, 1937), but also because entrepreneurs evaluate resources 
and their potential differently, depending on their varying preferences. Hence, the value of 
the resources is always in the eye of the beholder (e.g., Foss & Ishikawa, 2007; Foss, Klein, 
Kor, & Mahoney, 2008).  
 The radical subjectivist strand of Austrian economics (Lachmann, 1976, 1986) further 
suggests that it is not only perceptions of (potential) resource availability, but also the 
imagined actions enabled by these resources that play an important role (Chiles et al., 2007; 
Chiles, Tuggle, McMullen, Bierman, & Greening, 2010; Foss et al., 2008; McMullen, 2010). 
If evaluations of resource availability depend on how entrepreneurs imagine making use of 
resources to support a venture (Cohen et al., 1972; George, 2005; Mishina et al., 2004), their 
dissimilar imagining creates heterogeneity in perceived resource positions. The imagined 
action scenarios vary partly according to how entrepreneurs make use of the resources they 
have at hand, such that a similar resource base (e.g., equal amounts of available funds) can 
have different implications for different entrepreneurs (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Chiles, 
Tuggle, et al., 2010; Mosakowski, 2002).  
 Because resource positions are perceptual and dependent on imagined action 
scenarios, and sensemaking processes influence decision making, firm-level measures of 
constraints and slack, as used in most studies, appear inadequate for understanding the 
relationship between resource positions and decision making. Moreover, resource 
availability, foreseen resource demand and imagined futures may change with time, creating 
a need to consider resource positions from a process perspective.  
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Method 
This study adopts a process research approach (Langley, 1999) to explore resource positions 
and decision making over time. Using in-depth case studies that incorporate multiple sources 
of data, we help advance theory by studying (the underlying dynamics of) resource positions 
and how they affect decision making (Lee, 1999; Locke, 2001; Yin, 2009). This qualitative 
research design is appropriate, considering the (1) absence of adequate metrics for measuring 
resource positions, which implies the need for an exploratory approach; (2) perceptual and 
relative nature of resource positions, which demand a method that can incorporate (real-life) 
contextual conditions; and (3) ephemeral nature of resource positions, which renders cross-
sectional research largely inadequate.  
 
Case selection 
We selected three high-tech start-up firms in different emerging industries. The relation 
between resource positions and decision making is easier to establish for nascent than for 
mature firms (Renko et al., 2010), and the creation and development processes of start-ups 
often involve decision making under uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), such that 
resources have key roles, especially for high-tech start-ups (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). 
Therefore, we selected start-ups in the telecom and solar energy industries, which were 
relatively immature industries at the time our focal start-ups were founded (1997, 1999, and 
2000). Because their industries were marked by high degrees of uncertainty, the 
entrepreneurs had substantial freedom to choose their venture’s path to market, rather than 
having to conform to mature market structures (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).  
 Each case covers the venture’s development, from idea conception, through the 
founding of the venture, to commercial exploitation and market interaction. With our 
objective of studying resource positions and their influence on decision making and venture 
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development, we needed to study the venture from its very start, to determine how initial 
resource positions affect its development and entrepreneurial decision making (Shane & 
Stuart, 2002; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965), and for a period long enough to 
allow for some evolution (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). We selected ventures that were 
founded at approximately the same time and in the same country (The Netherlands), to avoid 
substantial variance due to differences in national culture or economic climate. To avoid a 
(strong) success bias, we selected two successful ventures (i.e., substantial growth in staff 
and/or revenues) and one failure (i.e., no growth, insolvency, bankruptcy). We provide an 
overview of the three cases (SunCo, ChipCo and TextCo) in Table 1.  
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 
Data collection 
The data include archival and interview data. The archival data collected (149 documents) 
consist of annual reports, strategic planning documents, patents, company presentations, 
newspaper articles, web articles and public interviews. Interviews (28 in total) were 
conducted with the founders, employees, investors and other important stakeholders of the 
ventures. During the semi-structured interviews, we first invited the interviewees to elaborate 
on their role in the organization and describe the development trajectory of the venture. 
Subsequently, we posed questions about important decisions during the venture’s 
development trajectory, especially those related to the management team and employees, 
products and services, clients, revenue models, suppliers, partners, competitors, intellectual 
property protection, locations and facilities. We also asked about environmental shifts, such 
as market dynamism or important changes in the business environment. If the interviewee 
mentioned significant events, we asked follow-up questions to obtain sufficient details. 
During these discussions we raised additional questions, when relevant, about (initial) 
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resource endowments, resource needs, resource acquisition, and planning and decision 
making. (The complete interview protocol is available on request.) The interviews lasted 69 
minutes on average and were conducted by at least two interviewers; with the exception of 
one telephone interview, all the interviews were conducted face-to-face. If necessary, we 
requested additional information or conducted follow-up interviews for clarification. Each 
interview was digitally recorded and transcribed.  
 
Data analysis 
To investigate how resource positions evolve and influence decision making, we sought to 
identify resource positions at the time of the decision and processes by which they influenced 
decision making. Therefore, the data analysis consisted of three steps, using coding 
procedures developed by Van de Ven and Poole (1990).  
 First, we analysed the interview transcripts together with archival data to create a 
case-specific event list of important decisions—locations, management team, employees, 
products and services, investments, clients, suppliers, partners, and competitors—for each 
firm. Significant decision-making events such as introducing a first product, contacting a 
potential customer or hiring an employee involve various degrees of creativity. Creative 
decision making typically entails the exploration of new ideas, areas, products or 
technologies. In each case, a member of the research team identified and coded these events, 
and then these initial event lists were subjected to extensive discussions among the research 
team, until we reached consensus on their identification. For each event, we recorded the time 
of occurrence, to facilitate chronological ordering. We used QSR Nvivo software to code the 
events, which helped us maintain a chain of evidence across the raw interview data, archival 
data, and events (Yin, 2009). To mitigate any retrospective bias, we collected data about each 
significant event from at least two sources (e.g., interviews and documents), such that any 
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biases or memory lapses were likely offset by those of other informants (Golden, 1992; 
Huber & Power, 1985). In addition, we concentrated on significant events, which are easier to 
remember more accurately (Chell, 2004). Finally, we sent the event lists to the interviewees 
for validation. The final lists (30–41 events per case) enabled us to consider single decision-
making events, as well as their longitudinal implications (Langley, 1999).  
 Second, the analysis focused on determining the decision-making process for each 
event. We coded these processes according to the decision trigger (or decision-motivating 
tension; Zeleny, 1982) and subsequent decision outcome, in the form of an observed action. 
Two types of decision triggers demand action by entrepreneurs: organizational objectives and 
environmental change. Both triggers emerged from our data analysis and also correspond 
with previous research (Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Keeney, 1994; Voss et al., 2008). In addition, 
we coded the resource position, as perceived by the entrepreneurs, according to the decision 
to be made in relation to each particular event. The decision-making process coding began 
with all three members of the research team coding the first 30 events of the TextCo case 
together. Next, one team member coded the remaining events in the first case and discussed 
these codes with the team. Two team members used the refined coding rules to code the 
remaining two cases; that is, each case was coded by at least two team members. The 
subsequent discussion led to some minor changes, but all differences in codes assigned by 
different coders were resolved through discussion. For the observed resource position codes, 
we found that we needed a more elaborate discussion; so two members of the research team 
worked together to identify the resource positions perceived by the entrepreneurs and 
establish appropriate categorizations. These categories thus materialized from our data, rather 
than prior theory, related to the different resources available relative to demand at the time of 
the decision. After carefully (re)examining all events, we iteratively refined and aggregated 
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the categories, which produced a coding scheme that we applied to code all the events again. 
Table 2 displays the final coding scheme, definitions, and illustrative quotes. 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
 The analysis ultimately yielded six resource positions (i.e., perceived resource 
availability relative to perceived resource demand) at the time of a decision. We identified 
three types of constraints: financial, capacity, and capability. In accordance with our 
conceptualization of resource positions, these three types of constraints mirrored the three 
types of resource slack we identified. Financial resource positions reflect the relative 
availability of cash or other financial means; capacity resource positions refer to operational 
or production capacity; and capability resource positions involve human resources or know-
how (see Table 2). Unlike previous research in this area that mainly draws on firm-level 
measures (Daniel et al., 2004; Mishina et al., 2004), we define resource positions as the 
abundance or shortage of resources perceived by the entrepreneur. A focus on (the 
heterogeneity among) individual entrepreneurs is essential, because researching firm-level 
phenomena must start with the individuals constituting these firms (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 
2008; Felin & Foss, 2005; Foss, 2011). 
 To facilitate further in-depth analyses, we created tables with information about the 
decision-making processes in each start-up. These tables include, for all events, the (decision-
making) event number, year the event took place, decision trigger, resource position at the 
time of the decision, decision outcome, and illustrative quotes. For each case, Tables 3–5 
show the decision-making processes for key decision-making events.  
 Finally, we conducted in-depth analyses of the decision-making processes. To trace 
patterns in resource positions over time, we created a graphical overview of the resource 
positions per event per case (see Figure 2). By combining these overviews with detailed 
descriptions of the events in the decision-making process tables (e.g., Tables 3–5), the nature 
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of the resource positions could be studied. Noting the large variety in resource position 
configurations, i.e., combinations of different types of slack and constraints, we grouped 
events with similar resource positions across cases, to analyse their relation with decision 
making. In so doing, we drew on several tabular representations to group events by the types 
of resource slack, resource constraints and their particular combinations. However, in 
grouping the events and establishing a link between resource positions and decision making, 
we did not identify any direct, consistent effects of resource positions. Therefore, we 
redirected our attention toward the underlying dynamic complexity that appears to influence 
the relationship between resource positions and decision making.  
---------- Insert Tables 3-5 and Figure 2 about here ---------- 
 
Findings  
In this section we start with the case descriptions of the three start-ups. Next, several key 
findings on the transient and multidimensional nature of perceived resource positions are 
discussed. Finally, we synthesize the outcomes of the process analyses in terms of the 
underlying dynamics of resource positions and decision making.  
 
Case descriptions 
 SunCo. In early 2000, the founder of a small energy company and the founder of a 
multinational glass company combined forces and started a new company in the solar panel 
industry. The two entrepreneurs had different ideas about how to develop the company, so 
they adopted a dual strategy: The founder from the small energy company set out to build a 
project-based business in The Netherlands and neighbouring countries, focused on selling and 
integrating solar panels already available on the market, while the other founder committed 
large upfront investments to developing a radically new solar technology. In the first few 
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years, the project-based business expanded internationally (Europe and the United States) 
while the technology development process ran increasingly behind schedule and depleted the 
initial budget, as a result of several major problems. When the economic crisis hit in 2008, 
demand for SunCo’s products and services dropped, and major liquidity problems emerged. 
The company’s leadership developed various alternative strategies to get through the crisis 
and finally chose to cooperate with an experienced partner to develop the new solar 
technology, so that it could get the product to market. 
 ChipCo. After being approached by a venture capital (VC) firm in 2000, a professor 
and doctoral student from the electrical engineering department of a Dutch university realized 
the potential of starting a company based on the optical chip technology they had invented. 
Noting the growing use of broadband telecommunication, the VC firm offered the researchers 
substantial funding, provided that they would develop a commercial proposition for the 
global telecom market. The team was unable to translate its findings into a business case 
though, so an outside CEO with extensive telecom experience was hired to start the business. 
After obtaining the VC funding, the start-up team set out to develop its first product, a 
demonstrator chip that incorporated the expertise of three doctoral dissertations on optical 
integration. In 2000, during the product development phase, the telecom industry crashed 
with the collapse of the dot.com bubble, and major telecom operators faced severe losses. 
Confident in their abilities, ChipCo’s team continued the product development process and 
hired additional employees. Although potential customers were impressed by the team’s 
abilities, they remained unwilling to purchase the new chip, because its implementation 
demanded an extensive system redesign. In need of cash, the entrepreneurs quickly developed 
a second, more marketable product and started looking for additional funding but were 
unsuccessful in the rapidly declining industry. This crisis motivated the team to look for other 
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applications and markets for the technology, but without success. With no other options left, 
the company filed for bankruptcy in June 2003. 
 TextCo. In 1999, two industrial engineering students explored new ways of making 
money by advertising for nightclubs. They noted the growing use of mobile telephones and 
thus decided to use text messages (SMS) as an advertising tool for their local nightclub. After 
collecting the mobile numbers of people entering Belgian nightclubs, the students used their 
university laptops and their parents’ Internet connections to send advertising messages. When 
this experiment proved successful, they started a company to offer SMS services to other 
types of Dutch and Belgian businesses, such as logistics firms. The founders also tried to 
develop and introduce new products in the market and opened an office in Poland, though 
they were forced to close this foreign office when their products failed to catch on locally. In 
response to customer feedback, the founders successfully developed a new service, a 24-hour 
monitoring system for SMS traffic. In 2002, a key competitor launched a new concept, in 
which it charged customers extremely high fees to receive text messages that allowed them to 
participate in televised SMS voting. TextCo’s founders thought little of this new use and 
stuck to their existing operations, but the competitor’s concept proved to be a huge success. 
Four years later, TextCo’s founders sought to claim some share of this opportunity, while 
expanding their operations to other European countries. 
 
Perceived and transient resource positions 
We identified different types of resource positions, as shown in Table 2. A closer inspection 
of the perceived resource positions in each case and across cases, in Figure 2 and the 
decision-making process tables (key events in Tables 3–5), reveals several interesting 
observations. In particular, entrepreneurs’ perceptions of resource positions are not static but 
transient and changing over time. Perceived resource positions can change any time a 
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situation involves some reflection on (anticipated) available resources relative to (anticipated) 
resource demand. Both perceived resource availability and perceived resource demand can 
shift easily, such that the resource position perceived by the entrepreneur becomes a transient 
imagination. For example, by the end of 2002, the founders of SunCo believed they had 
sufficient financial resources to buy an existing solar development project, but this view 
changed when a key supplier (which they already had prepaid thousands of Euros) was about 
to go bankrupt. This anticipated financial constraint stimulated the entrepreneurs to come up 
with an idea to prevent severe losses.  
 This example also illustrates how anticipated resource positions arise from 
imaginations of the future and influence entrepreneurial decision making: anticipated 
financial constraints (i.e., expected bankruptcy of supplier) led the entrepreneurs to act to 
prevent future losses. These findings highlight how resource positions may enter subjectively 
imagined futures (Chiles et al., 2007). The constantly changing positions and configurations 
of the bars in Figure 2 reflect the ever-changing perceptions of (anticipated) resources 
relative to demand, demonstrating the transient nature of perceived resource positions. 
Therefore, the time-invariant or annual measures of slack and constraints used in previous 
studies (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003) appear to 
generate situational snapshots, with limited longitudinal reliability.  
 We also explore how understanding resource positions as perceived and transient 
might relate to conventional, firm-level measures of resource positions. In Figures 3-5, we 
depict different operationalizations of financial slack and constraints for all three cases, 
including three common firm-level measures of financial resources (relative to demand) 
obtained from annual reports: cash (George, 2005; Voss et al., 2008), current assets divided 
by current liabilities or current ratio (Bourgeois, 1981; Bromiley, 1991; Daniel et al., 2004), 
and the difference between current assets and current liabilities (Bradley, Wiklund, et al., 
20 
 
2011; Mishina et al., 2004). A comparison of longitudinal patterns reveals that the firm-level 
financial measures convey different, and at times inconsistent, information with respect to the 
level of financial slack. The three firm-level measures produce graphs with different shapes, 
implying opposite conclusions. Consider, for example, Figure 3(a) versus Figure 3(c) for 
TextCo: The cash measure (a) indicates substantial excess financial resources during 2006–
2008, whereas the difference measure (c) implies significant financial constraints in the same 
period, because current liabilities exceed current assets. This important finding sheds some 
new light on why previous studies offer conflicting results regarding the effects of slack and 
constraints.  
 Figure 3(d) further illustrates the difference between these objective financial 
measures and perceived, transient resource positions. Consider 2007 for TextCo. The firm-
level financial measures indicate the company is experiencing either financial slack or 
financial constraints for the entire year; our approach reveals a more fine-grained and 
dynamic picture. Thus, firm-level measures appear poorly suited for capturing and 
incorporating the subjective nature of resource positions (Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Tuggle, 
et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2008; Kor, Mahoney, & Michael, 2007). Researchers must attend to 
the heterogeneity among individual entrepreneurs to understand firm-level outcomes (Felin & 
Foss, 2005; Foss, 2011), particularly with regard to their subjective perceptions of resource 
positions (Foss et al., 2008).  
 A micro-level perspective of dynamic perceived resource positions over time entails 
both subjective and volatile resource availability and subjective and variable imagined 
resource demands. For example, TextCo’s entrepreneurs experienced both financial slack and 
constraints during 2007, depending on their perceptions of their financial resources available 
relative to the amount they needed. Its founders were looking to expand the company, but 
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financial constraints limited their ability to do so, so the founders made the decision to start 
looking for investors, as TextCo Founder 2 explained: 
First, that did not work really well, because we didn’t have a track record.… Then we hired 
someone to make a business plan and slides and then we went to visit 10 investors. 
 
Yet in the same year, TextCo’s founders experienced enough excess financial resources to 
take over entire divisions of competing companies. Founder 2 further noted, 
[In] 2007, there were so many acquisitions. And we took part in that too.… And we did that 
twice, successfully. So we just told competing companies: “We are buying your division!”… 
We told them: “Yes, you will sign over your customers to us and we will give you money in 
return.” 
 
 In summary, considering resources positions as perceived and transient offers an 
appropriate approach, because it provides a more accurate, fine-grained representation than 
do firm-level measures. These observations also correspond well with events that can be 
tracked in firm-level measures. Returning to Figure 2, we find that the solid bars representing 
TextCo’s financial resource positions do not exhibit a particular pattern but move almost 
randomly up and down over time, in line with the company’s internal cash flow financing 
strategy and organic growth. SunCo’s financial resource positions in Figure 2 instead indicate 
a wave-like pattern, representative of its initial large financial commitments to product 
development, followed by the constraining effects of the economic downturn. ChipCo’s 
financial resource positions in Figure 2 also display a pattern consistent with its (anticipated) 
venture capital rounds and subsequent bankruptcy: financial slack during the first rounds of 
venture capital, followed by a series of constraints related to costly production. Later, in 
anticipation of new funding, it made investments to speed up the development process, but 
the inability to attract additional funding led ChipCo to declare bankruptcy. 
---------- Insert Figures 3-5 about here ---------- 
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Multidimensional resource positions 
Different types of resource constraints and resource slack can be perceived simultaneously, as 
also illustrated in Figure 2. In contrast with one-dimensional measures, which indicate that 
firms experience either resource constraints or slack, we observe simultaneous combinations 
of constraints and slack. Therefore, resource positions appear multidimensional, in contrast 
with the conventional wisdom that implies constraints or slack are absolute positions in time 
(Bradley, Wiklund, et al., 2011; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003). By identifying 
financial-, capacity- and capability-related resource positions (see Table 2), we observe that 
entrepreneurs can experience constraints and slack capabilities at the same time, as illustrated 
by ChipCo’s event 14 in Figure 2. In 2001, the founders of ChipCo anticipated severe 
financial constraints; they needed to secure a second round of VC funding but also received a 
complaint from another company claiming patent infringement. ChipCo’s CEO explained:  
During the second round funding we faced a blocking patent, … where we would have to pay 
royalties of about 20 percent on everything we sold and a sign-up fee of, I believe, half a 
million, really ridiculous.…We were in the middle of [securing] that investment round and 
our [potential VC investor] told us: “This is a major event, so we will need to see. This 
changes the entire situation.”  
  
At the same time, ChipCo employed top-notch scientists, with plenty of underutilized (slack) 
capabilities. According to its CEO,  
The brainpower of our guys, I mean, we had about four or five PhD’s from [university X], 
super smart guys, real beta’s—tremendous amount of respect for those guys who all got their 
PhD at the intersection of physics and electrical engineering, real eggheads with international 
status.… They worked to see if they could come up with a re-design to work around the 
patent. Within two weeks they came up with seven re-designs…!  
 
In this example, financial constraints arising from patent infringement and slack capabilities 
jointly characterized the resource position at the time of the decision; together they spurred 
creative solutions. The finding that entrepreneurs can (simultaneously) perceive different 
types of constraints and slack reflects early theorizing about the role of resources in 
organizations (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1993; Scott, 1987; Thompson, 1967), and it signals 
that attempts to attribute particular effects to one-dimensional measures are highly 
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problematic. The use of one-dimensional measures can result in outcomes driven by 
unobserved factors, which may explain the mixed prior findings regarding the effects of 
resource slack and constraints. Resource slack or constraints thus cannot be scrutinized in 
isolation; instead, they must be examined in more comprehensive ways.  
 
Mixed effects of constraints and slack: Underlying dynamics  
We now turn to exploring how perceived, anticipated and relative resource positions pertain 
to decision making. Previous research has not been able to provide consistent insights 
regarding the effects of resource constraints or slack. We grouped events with similar 
resource positions in tables to establish a link between resource positions and decision 
making; however, we did not detect a recurrent or systematic pattern at the event level. The 
perception of constraints in some instances motivates entrepreneurs to engage in some 
creative explorations (e.g., Table 4, event 28, ChipCo); whereas entrepreneurs perceiving 
constraints in other settings do not pursue that direction (Table 3, event 25, SunCo). Similar 
results arise with regard to the effects of slack resources (Table 5, events 14 versus 21, 
TextCo). At times, constraints encourage the production of creative ideas; at other times, 
slack resources stimulate such ideas; and in still other instances, neither constraints nor slack 
induce creative solutions. But why do constraints and slack not have univocal effects?  
 In line with our theoretical argument, our findings show that a decision outcome is 
unlikely to relate directly to an observed resource position. The relationship between resource 
positions and decision making instead depends on several underlying dynamics, including 
those at the individual, temporal, and resource position levels. In the remainder of this 
subsection, we ground these key factors and relationships in our data. 
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Individual dynamics. Analysis of the relation between resource positions and decision 
outcomes suggests entrepreneur-specific effects. Different entrepreneurs have unique 
backgrounds and perceptions of their ventures’ resource availability and demands that lead 
them to construct specific ideas about how to make their decisions; the decision outcome 
observed likely arises from the interaction between the entrepreneurs leading the venture. For 
example, both SunCo and TextCo started with two founders, each with their own perceptions 
of resource availability, resource demands, and options to develop the venture.  
SunCo’s Founder 1, who previously had started and operated a small energy company, 
explained how his background influenced his view of the situation: 
I wasn’t born rich. At one time, I started in a chicken barn of 500 square meters.… That’s 
where I started with, to first prove that it works, so I put in the small amount of money I 
owned.  
 
Then, after he met SunCo Founder 2: 
So we started SunCo. I owned half of the company and [Founder 2] the other half.… When 
you talk about starting, it was very small scale, facilitated by another small company I owned. 
It was just me, with one other guy. We did not start with huge investments. But built up very 
slowly … dipping your toes in the water to feel how warm it is, to find out whether to proceed 
or hold back. 
 
SunCo Founder 2 came from a multinational company and believed there were no financial 
constraints, which resulted in a different approach to the venture. The company’s chief 
technology officer, one of the first employees, explained: 
[Founder 2] came in and said: “I want to make solarpanels, go figure it out!”… In addition to 
the entrepreneurship style of [Founder 2], the beginning of the story is: this founder wants this 
specific technology, and that’s what we started with. 
 
SunCo Founder 1 added:  
We did invest a great deal in development. Compared to many other companies, really a lot. 
But it is because, for [Founder 2], it was worth the money. He told us: “this is what I want to 
do, this is my project. I will put in a lot of money because I believe in it.” 
 
TextCo Founder 1 also recognized the differences between his and Founder 2’s perceptions: 
You need to grow every dimension of your company. At first, this was difficult to get used to. 
Because it meant one had to make large investments which were, at that time, somewhat 
excessive, but needed in future. And this is where an important difference between me and 
[Founder 2] becomes visible. [Founder 2] is more of a visionary, he is able to foresee the 
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future, what will be needed, and invest. I’m more conservative: Should we really do this? 
Why not focus on minimal investment? This is a very interesting and healthy tension. Whose 
plan of action is taken, comes down to who has the most convincing arguments. 
 
These examples effectively show how prior experiences influence entrepreneurs in making 
sense of their perceived resource availability and demand (Weick, 1995). Not only individual 
perceptions play a role (Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Vultee, et al., 2010), but interactions 
within the organization also affect the relationship between perceived resource positions, 
decision making and creativity (Ford & Gioia, 2000; McMullen, 2010). Many decisions made 
by SunCo and TextCo arose from negotiated compromises, based on inter-subjectivity or 
joint sensemaking by pairs of entrepreneurs with different attitudes (Weick, 1995), which 
influenced the overall creativity in these decisions (Ford & Gioia, 2000). However, the 
founders also actively engaged in perspective taking, allowing their partners sufficient 
resources and time to experiment.  
  
Temporal dynamics. Regarding the connection among multiple events within a case, our 
findings suggest that the influence of resource positions on decision making is not consistent 
over time but rather is subject to temporal dynamics. Past experiences (paths) influence the 
decision-making process and thus the relationship between resource positions and decision 
outcomes. Such path-dependent effects occur when entrepreneurs only see options along their 
existing path, despite possible changes in their perceived resource position. In this case, 
entrepreneurs decide according to routine first (i.e., choosing the familiar path) rather than 
according to their current, changed resource position.  
 The product development phase at the VC-backed ChipCo clearly revealed path-
dependent effects. Its initial financial slack facilitated a development trajectory, free of short-
term financial and environmental pressures; later ChipCo persisted with the development of 
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its product, even in the face of severe resource constraints. Founder 1 explained that, at first, 
he believed all necessary resources were available:  
When we started, both VC investors told us: “don’t bother about attracting subsidies. It is a 
lot of effort and a lot of hassle. If you need more money, then just ask for more money and 
you will get more money” … they [VC investors] pushed us: “Continue the development of 
the Holy Grail, don’t focus on simple sub-products [to generate cash-flow].” 
The CEO added:  
…it was just invested based on the needs of the technology. This has that much potential; this 
will turn out just fine. Something will come out of this: that has been the starting point. 
 
Because the founders of ChipCo believed their resource demands would always be met, they 
set out to develop a cutting-edge product that would incorporate all the technical expertise 
available to them.  
 However, by the final stages of the product development process, ChipCo’s target 
(telecom) market appeared on the brink of collapse, creating vast uncertainty. ChipCo’s 
founding team still perceived ample financial slack, in the form of substantial (existing and 
potential) VC funding. Founder 2 reflected on the decision to proceed with product 
development:  
Actually, it was the wrong time to … when you look back; it was really a very odd period to 
start a company. Actually, it is just not possible. A shrinking market and a completely new 
technology. 
 
As ChipCo continued with its product development activities, the costs increased drastically. 
Despite these (anticipated) financial constraints—a significant change in resource position—
the team still decided to continue with the initial idea and even increased the number of 
design runs. The CEO explained why ChipCo persisted, even when the perceived resource 
position changed from financial slack (7 million Euro of VC funding) to financial constraints 
(high development costs): 
At one point we had that 7 million. Initially, we did one design run every month. We 
improved our own process every run, as we were inventing something new. One run takes a 
100.000 Euro, as all parties have to perform their tasks every run. But we also had our daily 
costs of keeping the business going; we had to pay 20 staff members, the rental fees, et cetera. 
It is a very costly business. Then we increased to two runs a month and we burned our money 
even faster.  
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In addition to high operating fees and a collapsing telecom market, another problem surfaced: 
Customers were not willing to buy ChipCo’s products because they were not able to integrate 
them into existing systems. Faced with even greater financial constraints, ChipCo’s 
leadership saw few alternatives other than continuing to develop products for the telecom 
market. According to its VC investor:  
At that time, the feeling that we needed to generate revenue became stronger and stronger.… 
The long-term vision did not change, but the quest became: ok, what is needed for tomorrow? 
 
The entrepreneurs did not want to give up on ChipCo’s long-term (product development) 
goals, so they conceived of an intermediate product for the telecom market that would be 
more marketable but still based on the developed technology (i.e., slack capabilities). 
Founder 1 indicated: 
But then we thought about another application, a monitoring application, as this does not 
demand a significant redesign of the system. This can be plugged in [existing systems of 
telecom providers], and then we can at least sell something. It is based on the same 
technology we are already using, but then with [more] channels.… And yes, I think we were a 
little too late with that. 
 
In the end, after confronting the consequences of a collapsed market, ChipCo’s investors 
resigned themselves to failure. At that point, the founding team of the insolvent ChipCo 
finally saw how the routine had failed: ChipCo’s path had constrained the options that the 
founders could imagine, even when the situation (and resource position) kept changing. As 
soon as the founders were no longer able to follow the existing path, they acknowledged the 
need to explore alternative ideas. Founder 1 explained: 
At the moment that everybody … that the telecom market collapsed, that clients told us not 
now, not at this moment, then we started looking at alternatives. Yes, because, still we were 
able to build about anything.… The time to develop something to be used in a different 
market; this takes time and money. Both we did not have. 
 
ChipCo’s product development process thus illustrates that when entrepreneurs decide to 
stick to an existing path, unaffected by changes in resource positions, it impedes the timely 
imagination and exploration of creative solutions.  
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The SunCo case revealed a similar path dependency in its response to resource 
constraints. Such path dependency affects the relationship between resource position and 
decision making: Past experiences constrain the options entrepreneurs are able to imagine, 
even when changes in their resource position give them a reason to become creative. That is, 
unconstrained, forward-looking imagination can drive the creative decision-making process 
more effectively (in line with the Austrian argument; e.g., Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Tuggle, 
et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2008; McMullen, 2010), whereas approaches that rely on previous 
paths and experiences can constrain creativity (Keeney, 1994; Vergne & Durand, 2011; 
Weick, 1979, 1995) by making entrepreneurs less receptive to changes in resource positions. 
  
Resource position dynamics. Our findings suggest different types of resource constraints and 
slack are perceived simultaneously; together they make up the overall resource position 
perceived at the time of the decision. Perceived constraints and slack jointly influence the 
way entrepreneurs make decisions, so perceptions of different resource configurations have 
different effects. In 2008, SunCo set out to establish international sales offices for its 
modules, which led it to assess its resource position (Figure 2, event 19). According to 
SunCo’s chief operating officer: 
I think we were more a module producer. So, we built modules. But, as we grew, only 
building modules was not sufficient to create enough volume [to make profit].… When I 
arrived, there was a kind of organization that had a track record and a number of people who 
had, say, expertise [of project management] in their heads.… You just have to see you are 
capable of doing much more than just selling modules. So there is a lot of capability here and 
sometimes we can use those capabilities to help customers who are stuck with a project, we 
can help those customers because we are used to doing it too.… So we have an additional 
channel, an additional outlet to bring products to the market. Because we also add value, not 
just [deliver] a module, but a complete system, you generate an interesting margin.  
 
Thus, SunCo established a second line of business, in view of both (anticipated) financial 
constraints and slack capability. This example suggests it was the perception of this specific 
combination of constraints and slack that stimulated the novel idea of a second line of 
business, rather than the need to generate higher margins or underutilized existing 
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capabilities. When entrepreneurs perceive a combination of various resource positions, this 
specific combination affects their decision-making process, which makes it impossible to 
trace observed effects back to single resource positions. Moreover, studying resource 
positions in isolation may result in an incomplete picture of the entrepreneur’s perceived 
situation, which fails to account for any combination-specific effects of resource positions.  
 In the ChipCo case, we also observed an influence of perceived resource 
combinations (e.g., Figure 2, event 15). In 2001, when ChipCo’s founders started planning 
the production of their first product, they experienced for the first time all three types of 
resource constraints, because of the resources demanded: they did not have a cleanroom to 
develop their product (capacity constraint), nor did they have sufficient financial resources to 
build their own cleanroom facility (financial constraint), and the team also lacked the proper 
experience (capability constraint). The founders faced tough challenges, as ChipCo’s CEO 
recalled: 
With respect to operations, it is highly complex and incredibly expensive, it is a nightmare. 
So I almost developed a stomach-ache because of this, apart from the fact that I had 
absolutely no idea what it [building a cleanroom] was about. I cannot build such a thing.… 
 
Because, unlike other start-ups in the industry, ChipCo lacked sufficient financial resources 
to build a cleanroom, Founder 1 noted their production decision had to involve creative 
elements: 
Everybody, every start-up received 40 million dollars to build their own fab [cleanroom]. And 
well, we raised 7 million dollars that year, and yes, that is of course way too little to build 
your own fab. But that made us realize that we had to do things in a different way. So we 
started looking for production partners. And that is exactly the path we ended up taking. 
 
This particular combination of constraints pushed ChipCo’s founding team to come up with 
the idea for production partners. What would they have done, though, had they experienced 
fewer resource constraints or a different combination of constraints and slack? The way 
entrepreneurs make sense of their context and the options they imagine appears to depend on 
the (situation- and time-specific) perceived combination of resource positions. These findings 
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demonstrate how perceived combinations of different types of resource constraints and/or 
slack enter the decision-making process and influence the entrepreneur, generating 
idiosyncratic options with varying degrees of creativity. Therefore, our results extend 
entrepreneurship theory, in particular with regard to the process of resource (re)combination 
(Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Vultee, et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2008; Schumpeter, 1934), by 
showing how entrepreneurs not only engage in imaginative (re)combinations of existing 
resources but also can be guided by imaginative (re)combinations of perceived resource slack 
and resource constraints.  
 
Discussion  
We have explored the characteristics of resource positions and how they influence 
entrepreneurial decision making and creativity. Viewing resource slack and resource 
constraints as two extremes on a spectrum of resource positions constitutes an important step 
toward integrating the resource slack and resource constraints literature, which represent core 
discourses on organizational ingenuity. Perceived resource positions reflect the 
entrepreneur’s imagination of available resources relative to demand including anticipated 
resources or resource demands. Furthermore, resource positions are transient imaginations, 
allowing the entrepreneur to move along the constraint–slack spectrum over time. Resource 
positions are multidimensional constructs too; our findings show that entrepreneurs perceive 
different types of constraints and slack simultaneously (e.g., capacity constraints and 
financial slack), in line with prior work that has acknowledged the multidimensional nature of 
resources (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Voss et al., 2008). 
 Such perceived, anticipated and relative resource positions influence creative decision 
making, but not systematically. Constraints and slack do not have univocal effects, but rather 
lead to idiosyncratic decisions by entrepreneurs. Constraints sometimes encourage inventive 
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behavior, or slack resources might induce innovative activities; in other cases, neither 
constraints nor slack results in creative decisions. The relationship between resource positions 
and (creative) decision making thus is highly complex, influenced by underlying dynamics 
that tend to remain hidden in firm-level studies that rely on cross-sectional measures (Felin & 
Foss, 2005). By studying perceived, anticipated, and relative resource positions over time at 
the decision-making level, we demonstrate that the processes by which resource positions 
influence decision making depend on individual, temporal, and resource position dynamics. 
These results have notable implications for research and theory about the relationship 
between resources and creativity in decision making.  
 Perceived resource positions and individual dynamics. Resource positions reflect an 
entrepreneur’s perception of available resources relative to demand. Unlike previous research 
that has tended to overlook the role of individuals in organizations (Abell et al., 2008; Felin 
& Foss, 2005; Foss, 2011) because it adheres mainly to firm-level measures (Daniel et al., 
2004; Voss et al., 2008), we conceptualize resource positions as the abundance or shortage of 
resources perceived by the entrepreneur. Perceived resource availability and demand are 
entrepreneur-specific and highly subjective, in line with sensemaking (e.g., Cornelissen & 
Clarke, 2010; Weick, 1995) and Austrian economics (e.g., Foss & Ishikawa, 2007; Foss et al., 
2008) research. An entrepreneur’s imagination influences the subjective evaluation of 
available resources (Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Tuggle, et al., 2010; McMullen, 2010), so 
firm-level measures cannot address the heterogeneously perceived value of available 
resources in relation to imagined action scenarios. The commonly used, financial, firm-level 
measures, which result in contradictory characterizations of a start-up’s resource position, 
thus are less appropriate for describing the effects of resource slack and constraints.  
 The idea that resource positions are transient imaginations has important implications 
for related studies, because the relationship between resource positions and decision making 
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is subject to individual-level dynamics. Different entrepreneurs perceive resource availability 
relative to imagined demand in distinct ways—as clearly exemplified by the two SunCo 
founders—and therefore make different decisions. Our findings thus extend prior research 
that suggests that founders likely engage in creative and innovative activity by nature, by 
habit, or in response to certain resource positions (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Bundy, 2002; 
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). For example, effectuation theory implies that the way 
entrepreneurs make decisions depends on their individual expertise and the degree of 
uncertainty (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy et al., 2008; Read & Dolmans, 2012). As the 
degree of uncertainty may shift for each event, it is impossible to find a direct or 
generalizable effect of resource availability, because individual perceptions and decision 
making drive firm-level behavior and outcomes.  
 Various decision outcomes also arise from the interaction between entrepreneurs who 
team up for a particular venture. Both individual perceptions and interactions between 
individuals thus influence the relationship between perceived resource positions and decision 
making (Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Vultee, et al., 2010; Ford & Gioia, 2000; McMullen, 
2010). In this sense, our findings extend research on collective creativity by showing how 
interactions between entrepreneurs, perceiving distinct resource positions, can affect the 
production and implementation of creative ideas (Ford & Gioia, 1995; Hargadon & Bechky, 
2006; Kurtzberg & Amabile, 2001; Sawyer & DeZutter, 2009; Sawyer, 2008; Woodman et 
al., 1993). Our study also extends previous work on perspective taking and creativity 
(McMullen, 2010) as antagonistic perspectives might generate underlying tensions, and 
founders who cannot converge on a shared perspective on resource positions may nix their 
partners’ creative ideas. Ongoing research should incorporate these individual and collective 
effects and gather the perceptions of all entrepreneurs (and perhaps their stakeholders) about 
their resource availability and imagined resource demand.  
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 Transient resource positions and temporal dynamics. Perceived resource positions are 
not static, but change over time (George, 2005; Mishina et al., 2004). On an event basis, 
perceived resource positions can shift easily, such as when the founders of SunCo perceived 
that they had sufficient resources to buy an existing solar development project but shortly 
thereafter recognized significant financial constraints due to the expected bankruptcy of a key 
supplier. Time-invariant or annual measures of slack and constraints thus may not capture 
precisely how resource positions affect decision making (Daniel et al., 2004; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003). Capturing resource positions with a single observation only 
provides a situational snapshot, whereas both perceived resource availability and imagined 
resource demand are variable. The underlying temporal dynamics offer an important 
explanation of the mixed effects of resource constraints and slack, as they can blur the causal 
relationship between resource position and observed outcome. Depending on when resource 
positions, decisions and outcomes get measured, different conclusions emerge regarding the 
effects of constraints or slack. Measuring resource positions at a single point in time thus 
ignores the possibility that a follow-up measure would produce a completely different result. 
Therefore, subjective and longitudinal representations of resource positions (related to 
decision-making events) are necessary.  
 From the Austrian economics perspective, scholars have argued that the perceived 
nature of a firm’s resources reflects the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs and their dynamic 
perceptions of resources over time (e.g., Chiles et al., 2007). We extend these insights by 
showing that micro-level dynamics, including subjective and variable resource availability 
and subjective and variable imagined resource demand, determine the transient resource 
position (Figure 1). 
 Although perceived resource positions are variable, path-dependent effects dampen 
the variation in decisions made on the basis of resource positions (Hannan, 1998; Romme, 
34 
 
2004; Stinchcombe, 1965). The ChipCo case reveals how entrepreneurs can grow 
accustomed to a routine for dealing with problems, and that routine regulates their future 
behavior, regardless of their resource position (Heiner, 1983; March & Simon, 1958). Even 
when confronted with resource shortages, they may seek to exploit their past successes by 
engaging in local learning and optimization, rather than learning from distant places or 
exploring new opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Entrepreneurs can 
become trapped in an exploitative learning cycle, such that they simply fail to take into 
account their actual resource position. These findings extend existing research by showing 
that the influence of both resource slack and constraints is subject to organizational routines 
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Unconstrained 
forward-looking imagination can drive creative decision-making processes (e.g., Chiles, 
Tuggle, et al., 2010), whereas approaches relying on past paths and experiences can constrain 
creativity (Keeney, 1994; Vergne & Durand, 2011; Weick, 1979, 1995), which makes 
entrepreneurs less receptive to changes in resource positions. This happens when 
entrepreneurs see few alternatives besides the obvious ideas they have implemented before 
(Keeney, 1994; Lubart, 2001). The notion of path dependency thus helps explain 
entrepreneurial decision making (in view of resource positions) and the level of creativity in 
entrepreneurial decisions.  
 Furthermore, entrepreneurs do not make decisions in a vacuum. We have focused on 
the individual entrepreneur, to elucidate the micro-foundations of the effect of resources 
(Felin & Foss, 2005; Foss, 2011), but the strategy and organizational design of the firm also 
can create path dependency. Major commitments to capital providers and employees make it 
hard, if not impossible, to change decisions radically (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), which may 
reduce the level of creativity in key decisions. Such path-dependent effect is evident in the 
failure case, in that ChipCo’s founders had such strong commitments to their current path that 
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only after the team ran out of alternatives did it decide to explore new options. In the two 
other cases, the founders were more responsive and proactive in their approaches to change.  
 Multidimensional resource positions and resource position dynamics. Simultaneity of 
resource constraints and slack challenges the conventional wisdom that constraints or slack 
take absolute positions in time (e.g., Bradley, Wiklund, et al., 2011; Tan & Peng, 2003). Our 
results imply that resource positions are multidimensional, such that different types of slack 
and constraints occur at the same time. Early theory about the role of resources in 
organizations suggested this simultaneity (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1993; Thompson, 1967), 
but recent studies tend to overlook these insights.  
 These simultaneous perceptions can create problems for researchers who want to 
attribute particular effects to one-dimensional interpretations of resource positions, whereas 
firms, such as SunCo, might establish a second line of business in view of both financial 
constraints and slack capability. Moreover, the relationship between resource positions and 
decision making appears subject to such combinations in resource positions; because 
different configurations of resource constraints and slack jointly influence entrepreneurs’ 
decisions, it is difficult to attribute any specific decision outcomes to a single type of resource 
constraint or slack. Investigating constraints or slack in isolation produces an incomplete 
picture of the resource position, which may explain mixed effects in previous studies (Hoegl 
et al., 2008; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010). Our case studies also illustrate how perceived 
combinations of different types of resource constraints and slack enable entrepreneurs to 
generate idiosyncratically creative options, which extends existing theory about the process 
of resource (re)combination (Chiles et al., 2007; Chiles, Vultee, et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2008; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Entrepreneurs not only engage in imaginative (re)combinations of 
existing resources, but also are affected by imaginative (re)combinations of perceived slack 
and constraints in resources. 
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Conclusion  
This article sheds new light on the ongoing debate about the effects of resource constraints 
and slack and the circumstances under which organizational ingenuity may emerge. We show 
how the relationships of resource positions, decision making and creativity depend on 
underlying dynamics that remain concealed in cross-sectional studies at the firm level. By 
conceiving of resource positions as perceived, anticipated and relative, we clarify how 
perceived resource positions influence organizational ingenuity in terms of decision making 
and creativity—not systematically, but according to individual, temporal, and resource 
position dynamics. Individual-level dynamics relate to how different entrepreneurs, even 
those working in the same venture, may perceive resource availability relative to demand in 
distinct ways; individual-level dynamics also relate to how interactions between 
entrepreneurs affect decisions. Temporal dynamics imply that the influence of resource 
positions on decision making is not consistent over time, as past experiences can influence 
the decision-making process and hence the relationship between resource positions and 
decision outcome. Finally, resource position dynamics pertain to how combinations of 
different types of resource constraints and/or slack enter the decision-making process and 
lead to unique outcomes. 
 Our finding that resource constraints and slack are transient with the entrepreneur’s 
perception of available resources and resource demands has important implications for 
further investigations of the effects of resource positions. To link resource positions to 
outcomes of interest, researchers should assess both resource availability and perceived 
resource demands, preferably on an event-specific basis. Future work also needs to 
acknowledge that resource positions are multidimensional, and moreover that the 
entrepreneur’s sensemaking of complex situations explains his or her decisions. To 
understand the effects of resource positions, one cannot examine resource constraints and 
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slack in isolation. Because entrepreneurs perceive resource availability in relation to demand, 
while individually and collectively making sense of the present, past and future, firm-level 
operationalizations are insufficient as well. Future research must build on individual and 
collective interpretations of resource positions. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Several limitations of this study offer directions for research. First, we focused on short-term 
implications of resource positions for entrepreneurial decision making and ignored longer-
term effects. The potential value of investigating long-term (performance) effects may be 
somewhat questionable, considering that resource positions are transient imaginations. 
Nonetheless, longer-term implications, such as those associated with deployments of slack 
resources or new strategies implemented in response to resource constraints, need to be 
studied and assessed. Second, our results are based on data pertaining to more than 100 
events involving three companies, one of which was unsuccessful. The research design thus 
is not perfectly balanced; in-depth longitudinal studies, using larger samples with a more 
balanced research design, are likely to provide further insights. Third, our data pertain to 
high-tech start-ups in emerging industries. More research should explore whether similar 
patterns can be observed in other types of start-ups and in large corporations, in both 
emerging and mature industries.  
 With in-depth longitudinal studies, future research can also derive higher-level 
implications of resource positions and generate testable propositions. The use of process 
methods and individual- and collective-level interpretations of resource positions should 
clarify the causal relationships among resource positions, decision making, and creativity. 
Alternatively, more quantitative studies likely will be only as effective as the 
operationalizations adopted. Without appropriate measures, studies using quantitative 
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methods may be ineffective; because resource positions are transient imaginations grounded 
in individual and collective sensemaking, we suggest that additional work addresses the 
possibility of capturing, characterizing, and quantifying resource positions systematically. 
Finally, further research should expand understanding of the inner workings of, or interplay 
among, the underlying dynamics of resource positions. For example, future work can 
investigate how different levels of inter-subjectivity in perceived resource positions relate to 
creative imagination and decision making, or how organizational routines influence collective 
sensemaking within organizations. 
 We have empirically demonstrated how subjective perceptions of resource positions 
enter the entrepreneurial decision-making process that generates idiosyncratic options with 
varying degrees of creativity. As such, research exploring the relationships among 
entrepreneurship, resource positions, decision making and organizational ingenuity needs to 
incorporate such micro-foundational dynamics. 
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Table 1. Overview of Cases  
 SunCo ChipCo TextCo 
    
Country of origin The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands 
Period covered in study 1997-2010 2000-2003 1999-2010 
Number of events 36 30 41 
Total number of interviews 9 9 10 
Number of archival documents 63 54 32 
 
Table 2. The Resource Positions Identified (Coding Scheme) 
Resource Position Description Illustrative Quote 
Constraint Shortage of resource availability relative to resource demand  
Financial  Shortage available cash or other 
financial means 
Everybody, every start-up, received 40 million dollars to 
build their own fab. And well, we raised 7 million dollars 
that year, and yes, that is of course way to little to build your 
own fab. (Founder ChipCo) 
Capacity  Shortage of operational or 
production capacity 
Suddenly, demand drastically increased.… And then, I 
immediately started planning for a new factory, so we could 
expand. (Founder SunCo) 
Capability  Shortage of human resources or 
know-how 
What became apparent, was that they had very strong 
technological capabilities, but a lot less experience in terms 
of product feel, and on top of that almost no commercial 
experience. (VC investor ChipCo) 
Slack Excess of resource availability relative to resource demand 
Financial  Excess available cash or other 
financial means 
So every weekend I came back with maybe 5000 guilders we 
charged [the nightclubs] for the text messages. So all 
nightclubs continuously paid upfront for these text messages 
… we have always been funded by our customers. (Founder 
TextCo)  
Capacity  Excess operational or 
production capacity 
[After buying a factory] we had more volume, that’s good, 
but then came the crisis … we saw that there was going to be 
a lot of oversupply. (Founder SunCo) 
Capability  Excess human resources or 
know-how 
You just have to realize you’re able to do more than just 
selling modules. We have a great deal of skills here and 
sometimes we are able to help or advise our customers, who 
are stuck with a project, because we do it ourselves. 
(Founder SunCo) 
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Table 3: Decision-Making Process for Key Events, SunCo 
Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
3 1999 Need for office space after 
founding. 
Financial slack.  Founder 1 and Founder 2 establish a new entity, 
SunCo, facilitated by their existing businesses. 
They name their company after Founder 2’s 
company, as this name is already established 
and has a good reputation in the construction 
industry.  
When you talk about starting, it was very small-scale, facilitated by that 
another small company I owned. It was just me, with one other guy. We did 
not start with huge investments. But built up very slowly. (Founder 1 SunCo) 
 
4 1999 Founder 2 sees potential in 
a specific technology and 
wants to pursue the 
development of this 
technology 
Financial slack 
& capability 
constraint.  
The founders commit many resources to this 
technology development, and to establish the 
new technology, more people and technological 
specialists are hired.  
We did invest a great deal in development. Compared to many other 
companies, really a lot. But it is because, to the other shareholder [Founder 2], 
it was worth the money. He told us: “this is what I want to do, this is my 
project. I will put in a lot of money because I believe in it.” (Founder 1 SunCo) 
8 2001 Additional input 
(technological expertise) 
for technology 
development is needed. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
constraint.  
Strategic cooperation is started with research 
institutes in the Netherlands and abroad to 
perform specific technological development. 
We try to get the knowledge we need from anywhere; not only developing it 
within our organization. We are doing some co-development activities in-
house, because they are of key importance, but we avoid doing too much 
ourselves. At [University X] knew how to make crystals. We figured: then they 
can also make solar cells. So we contacted them and started joint development, 
together with research institutes in the Netherlands. (CTO SunCo) 
10 2002 Dutch renewable energy 
subsidies are unexpectedly 
stopped. 
Anticipated 
financial 
constraint. 
Founder 1 explores doing projects across the 
border with Germany, where solar energy is still 
subsidized. 
The subsidy programs of many renewable energy initiatives were discontinued. 
And so the entire Dutch solar energy industry went down. The grants 
discontinued – this became evident already in 2001. So we had to go abroad 
and that was actually the jump we made. (Founder 1 SunCo) 
12 2003 German solar cell supplier 
goes bankrupt, which 
already received 300K 
Euro in prepayments from 
SunCo. 
Capacity 
constraint & 
anticipated 
financial 
constraint. 
Founder 1 sees the opportunity of taking over 
the supplier’s factory, to get some money back 
and at the same time expand their business by 
integrating a supplier and getting a firmer 
foothold in the German market.  
The [supplier’s] factory lay idle in March 2003, while I had a few nice 
projects, for one of which I had deposited 300,000 Euro [to the supplier] which 
was now with the trustee in bankruptcy. You cannot imagine how it got me in 
a cold sweat and how this kept me awake. I immediately said to [Founder 2]: 
“we need to take over that business; the Dutch market is going down and they 
have our 300,000 Euro.” (Founder 1 SunCo) 
14 2003 As demand for solar 
panels increases, 
production capacity falls 
short. 
Financial slack 
& capacity 
constraint 
Founders increase production in the German 
factory that they just took over and plan an 
additional factory to produce modules for the 
expected demand. 
We took over and in September the factory was up and running again. Because 
of the high demand, at the end of the year we were profitable again, with 
cutbacks in the organization. And then I immediately started planning a new 
factory, where we could expand. (Founder 1 SunCo) 
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Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
22 2008 Technology development 
is not progressing, major 
problems appear during 
pilot production. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
constraint.  
Additional investments in technology 
development to solve the technological 
problems and keep the development on track.  
We are running behind schedule. But the concept is so convincing and 
[Founder 2] is so convinced it will become a success that he just pushes it 
through. This is actually also entrepreneurship: just say that we should 
persevere, believe in it. (CTO SunCo) 
23 2008 Shortage of raw material 
in the market drives up the 
prices, substantial 
prepayments are needed to 
secure sufficient material. 
SunCo is unable to pay 
these large pre-payments. 
Financial 
constraint. 
They co-invest in a U.S. silicon plant to get 
more reliable supply and stable prices for 
delivery. 
We only made solar modules and we did not have the money to grow very 
aggressively. And at that moment there was a big shortage of raw material in 
the value chain. … You had to pay millions of dollars in advance in order to 
get delivery contracts. We could not do much … we can do better ourselves, so 
therefore we wanted to be in the raw material business ourselves. (Founder 1 
SunCo) 
That's why we participated in a US-based joint venture with a raw material 
producer. Thereby we secured the basic material for solar modules. (COO 
SunCo) 
25 2008 Technology development 
is not progressing and the 
economic crisis sets in. 
Capability 
constraint & 
financial 
constraint. 
Joint venture with an East-Asian company to 
produce a related technology, as a backup for 
the original technology.  
Due to the crises and while not being market-ready with our first generation 
[products], the development became under pressure. So we had to delay the 
development, reduce the team to the core team, and we continued with the 
chosen technology.. .. [Did we want to] put [the development] aside: never. 
Think how to proceed: yes. Therefore we tried to connect with [the Eastern 
Asian company]. We said: we continue together with them, we can accelerate, 
and spread the risks. And now we have a situation better than ever imagined. 
(Founder 1 SunCo) 
30 2009 Due to the economic 
crisis, demand for solar 
modules drops, creating 
cash flow problems; banks 
halt loans. 
Financial 
constraint. 
SunCo starts negotiations with [a competitor] 
for a joint venture, which is needed to combine 
capacities and funding. The announcement of 
the merger also serves as an assurance to the 
banks that SunCo is still sustainable. 
An interesting moment was our planned merger with [a competitor]. In fact, 
we just bought time with the banks, to get our interest rates at a reasonable 
level and to restore our trustworthiness at the banks in 2009. (COO SunCo) 
 
34 2010 SunCo and a competitor 
negotiate the possible 
merger but cannot agree 
on the price. SunCo stays 
independent.  
Financial slack. SunCo withdraws from the merger; the 
(financial) need for cooperation has disappeared 
as well.  
We talked for months. We could not get on the same page and more and more 
we got the feeling that it was not going to happen. At some point, the 
negotiators lost their belief in the cooperation. In the first quarter of 2009, [the 
market] was very bad. The second [quarter] was slightly less, but in the latter 
half of the year the market quite recovered. We eventually had net profits in 
2009; not very much, but still. (Founder 1 SunCo) 
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Table 4: Decision-Making Process for Key Events, ChipCo 
Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
4 2000 VC investor notices that 
the professor and PhD 
students are struggling 
with defining their 
business. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
constraint. 
A CEO is hired by the VC investor to kick start 
the nascent venture by setting up the basic 
organizational structures, writing a business plan 
and basically defining their business.  
I linked the four technical founders to [the CEO] in order to talk to each other. 
The team matched and started planning a business. My thought was: if they 
come with a good plan, then we are going to finance it. (VC Investor ChipCo) 
The professor did not see it, and had no idea how to start a company. So they 
had many discussions on what they could do, where to focus on, products, etc. 
So [the VC investor] tried to coach them, but it resulted in nothing. Then they 
called me: “Go talk to the professor and his PhD students.” These chips are 
designed for the telecom market and my background is in the telecom market. 
(CEO ChipCo) 
7 2001 PhDs and CEO look to 
start company and 
funding is secured by 
means of a VC contract. 
Financial slack. ChipCo is founded, the founding team is 
composed, and office space is hired to have 
some space outside the university facilities. 
When the signature for the money was there, we could leave our jobs [at 
University X]; at least for some time there was salary. … When we were 
really separated from the university, we could think in a different way. This 
was the moment we really started thinking about the first form of a business 
plan. (Founder 1 ChipCo) 
10 2001 Founding team needs to 
determine the (scope of 
the) first product. 
Capability slack 
& financial 
slack. 
They invest in product development of a high-
end system-integrating chip for the telecom 
market, which would demonstrate the cutting-
edge technology and capabilities of ChipCo. 
On the one side, we had the VC’s, pushing us to proceed developing the holy 
grail not to focus on simple sub-products. We thought: we make first some 
hybrid model for a couple of simple products to get already some revenue 
while we continue the development of more complex products. [The VC 
investor] was totally against this, we had to completely focus on the holy 
grail.… This was not a real product, it was a demonstrator … which showed 
all aspects of our technological capabilities. (Founder 1 ChipCo) 
12 2001 The telecom market 
crashes and anticipated 
demand drops 
significantly. 
Financial slack. Despite the market changes, ChipCo continues 
the development of its product. 
Then the crisis came and so you could see the entire semiconductor industry 
collapse. As a consequence, some parties opened up their production facilities, 
which we could use [to develop our product]. (CEO ChipCo) 
15 2001 ChipCo needs to establish 
dedicated production 
facilities (a ‘fab’) for their 
integrating chip.  
Financial 
constraint, 
capability 
constraint & 
capacity 
constraint 
ChipCo searches for partners to outsource the 
production, since it does not have enough money 
for its own production facilities. 
[The CEO] and I were looking to build a fab ourselves, and in parallel we 
looked whether we could just use existing facilities. That was actually unusual 
in this business. Everybody, every start-up, received 40 million dollars to build 
their own fab. And well, we raised 7 million dollars that year, and yes, that is 
of course way too little to build your own fab. But that made us realize that we 
had to do things in a different way. So we started looking for production 
partners. And that is exactly the path we ended up taking. (Founder 1 ChipCo) 
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Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
19 2002 Product development and 
process improvement 
require additional 
employees and production 
runs 
Financial 
constraint 
(anticipated), 
capacity 
constraint 
The ChipCo team decides to increase the 
number of test runs, to enable quicker 
adjustments of the product with the aim to keep 
development on track.  
At one point we had that 7 million. Initially, we did one design run every 
month. We improved our own process every run, as we were inventing 
something new. One run takes a 100.000 Euro, as all parties have to perform 
their tasks every run. But we also had our daily costs of keeping the business 
going; we had to pay 20 staff members, the rental fees et cetera. It is a very 
costly business. Then we increased to two runs a month and we burned our 
money even faster. (CEO ChipCo) 
26 2002 Customer feedback on 
samples of the integrating 
chip indicates the product 
cannot be incorporated in 
the existing designs of 
potential customers.  
Capability slack 
& anticipated 
financial 
constraint. 
In view of future monetary constraints, ChipCo 
starts exploring options for an alternative 
product (based on its existing technology) that 
customers can implement more easily in their 
designs.  
When it became clear that the roadmap for integrated products was actually 
much further ahead than we thought, they [the ChipCo team] defined for 
example a new product which used the same functions in a completely 
different way, in this case a monitoring chip. ... It was more a niche market 
than [integrating chip], but at that time, the feeling that we needed to generate 
revenue became stronger and stronger… The long-term vision did not change, 
but the quest became: ok, what is needed for tomorrow? (VC Investor 
ChipCo) 
 
27 2002 ChipCo wants to start 
producing an additional 
product but has no 
revenue from the 
integrating chip. 
Financial 
constraint. 
Facilitated by the existing VC investors, the 
founding team visits more than 40 VCs to attract 
additional funding. 
I visited 40 international investors in half a year and presented the business 
plan. And I tried to summarize the entire company in a few PowerPoint pages. 
Twelve of them were interested in the company, but dropped out one by one. 
(CEO ChipCo) 
28 2003 ChipCo experiences the 
reinforcing effects of a 
collapsed target market, 
no product sales and few 
financing options.  
Financial 
constraint. 
To generate options to continue the company, 
ChipCo’s founders and engineers start exploring 
even more alternative applications of ChipCo’s 
technology, even in very distant fields, such as 
mobility and defence applications. 
At the moment that everybody…, that the telecom market collapsed, that 
clients told us not now, not at this moment, then we started looking at 
alternatives. Yes, because, still we were able to build about anything. So we 
looked at a project to make a supercomputer. …We looked at military 
applications. All sorts of communications, such as back-up facilities for banks. 
... We also looked at other applications, like motion sensors. We looked at the 
Segway, because we could integrate the gyroscopes that keep the thing upright 
on a square millimetre. We have looked at many opportunities where we could 
have created other applications. (Founder 1 ChipCo) 
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Table 5 Decision-Making Process for Key Events, TextCo 
Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
2 1999 The founders come up 
with the idea to use SMS 
technology for nightclub 
advertising. 
Capacity slack, 
capability slack 
& financial 
constraint 
The founders start experimenting with SMS. 
They collect phone numbers and send messages 
containing the weekly programme of the 
nightclub. They use existing contacts, and the 
university’s and parents’ resources. 
As students, we just had little expenses. … The first two years we worked 
without salary. We started fairly easy, each time taking small steps; we never 
had an investment requiring a big step.. ... We had a modem and a [telephone 
provider] phone to upload and post the message to a number. This was done 
for a list of 100 numbers, each number separately. For a hundred numbers, this 
was feasible. So, we asked our parents if we could use their telephone line and 
some sockets for plugging in the laptop. (Founder 1 TextCo) 
10 2000 Founders get several 
investment offers. 
Financial slack. The founders refuse several investment offers to 
keep full control over their business. They 
decide to go for cash-flow financing and do not 
need investment to finance their small 
development steps at the moment. 
For us, it was a choice whether or not we wanted to have external financers. 
Many companies in this sector have at some point chosen for venture capital 
and other investors. We have consciously chosen not to use external financing, 
though we had twenty times the chance to do so, if we wanted. This is a 
strategic choice we made: “Can you pay it yourself to facilitate growth?... Or 
would you grow more if you would have more money and would it be more 
productive if you get shareholders capital?” We deliberated over this choice 
over and over again. (Founder 2 TextCo) 
14 2001 A specific SMS service, 
Premium SMS (voting in 
TV shows) is introduced 
to the market by 
competitor [SmartText]. 
Financial slack. The founders decide not to pursue premium 
SMS; they do not believe in the concept. They 
continue their focus on bulk SMS (sending 
multiple messages at once). 
In 2001, a competitor [SmartText] … started with this idea of Premium SMS, 
together with [a popular TV-show were contestants compete to stay in a 
house]. The whole idea was that you can vote by means of SMS for who 
should leave the house, and you need to pay a guilder [for voting]. So we 
really made a bad decision at that moment, because we did not believe in it. 
(Founder 2 TextCo) 
17 2002 Founders want to expand 
their business in the 
nightclub sector, and one 
of the founders likes to 
experiment with 
introducing different 
products. 
Capability 
slack. 
Founder 1 introduces a new product: recording 
videos of parties at nightclubs and selling the 
videos on DVD. Moreover, he starts (among 
other things) importing and selling white gloves. 
Several times I really tried to bring other products to market, just because I 
like it. We did really quite bizarre things in the club market. I set up ‘[DVD 
product]’ for clubs. We went with five people and me as cameraman to clubs 
and recorded videos, which we then burned on DVD and people could buy 
them for 35 Dollars or Euros. It was so much fun, but very labour intensive. It 
was not really a great success. ... In Poland everybody was wearing white 
gloves; they love black light. So, I thought, let’s import white gloves from 
China. Great fun and we can experiment with them in the club market. We 
will see whether we will make [successful] business out of it. But it was not a 
mega business model. So, we tried several things. (Founder 1 TextCo) 
21 2003 The founders want to 
grow their company by 
offering more services. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
slack. 
The founders invest in research and 
development and file a patent (for 100K EUR) 
on a new product. 
We started thinking: if we send a text message to a file [of phone numbers], 
we can also send an e-mail. So we extended our system with email. We have a 
patent on [mail service] and on [firewall service]. (Founder 2 TextCo) 
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Event Year Decision Trigger Resource Position Decision Outcome  Illustrative Quote 
22 2004 A nightclub recommends 
exploring the Polish 
market and invites 
founders to Poland. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
slack. 
The founders accept the invitation, because they 
perceive that they cannot grow in their Dutch 
home market anymore. They open an office in 
Poland, facilitated by local contacts there. 
In 2004, one of our customers in the club market had family in Poland and 
asked us to come along to Poland. So, we went to Poland and looked around. 
There were also nightclubs that wanted to do some advertising. So, we copied 
the model we had in The Netherlands [to Poland]: going to the clubs, talking 
to people, etc.. We found a nice clever lady, we rented office space, and went 
there every month. That all went well. (Founder 1 TextCo) 
24 2004 As it starts operating 
outside nightclubs, speed 
and delivery statistics 
become very important to 
customers in logistics and 
banking sectors. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
constraint. 
The founders initiate the development and 
introduction of their monitor service, a SMS 
planning and monitoring system (that can also 
be used by other market parties). 
They [a logistics company] have integrated SMS in their planning system. We 
saw immediately that this service just has to work; if a message is late, they 
arrive late at a customer. .... So then we went through a learning process: how 
we are going to monitor and particularly how are we going to send those text 
messages and [check] how well that goes? Very quickly it was taken to a 
much higher level. … This is a product that takes the service to a much higher 
level. (Founder 1 TextCo) 
26 2006 TextCo notices the huge 
success of [SmartText] 
with Premium-SMS. 
Financial slack 
& capability 
slack. 
TextCo starts developing Premium-SMS 
technology. This decision was a strategic move; 
the same technology could be sold to other 
competitors as well. 
[SmartText] and the TV ran off with premium SMS. At a certain moment, I 
thought, we should actually do something with it. We took the decision. It was 
quite a sizeable investment, but monthly revenues are high as well. And we 
went on the market with a revolutionary new pricing model for that market. 
Our competitor [SmartText] earned perhaps 5 cent per text message; we said: 
just give us 500 Euro per month. The television show producers liked this idea 
very much since it lowered their costs with some 100k Euro. (Founder 1 
TextCo) 
35 2008 A large Dutch bank 
experiences problems 
with its current SMS 
service provider. 
Capability 
slack. 
TextCo’s founders approach the bank and offer 
their services. With their expertise, TextCo starts 
SMS service for banking (a new market), at a 
new service level.  
Our competitor experienced problems with the technology because they had 
had many personnel changes, so no one knew how the system worked. So this 
was our chance.... We took over two years ago. This was very exciting, 
because they actually send almost five text messages every second of every 
week-day. So that means that if, for just one minute, they are not paying 
attention, then 300 text messages go wrong, and because it concerns a bank, it 
means that for every text message a customer is missing payments. (Founder 1 
TextCo) 
37 2009 Industry standards are 
moving to 24-hour 
customer support. 
Financial slack 
& capacity 
slack. 
TextCo starts 24-hour support to control SMS 
traffic and service. They start with a few people 
to set up the 24-hour support centre. 
The light has not been turned off since January 2009. So there are always 
people here. ... We really decided not to outsource [this 24h service], but to do 
it ourselves. A reasonable investment, but there are also many people using the 
[bank]. It concerns a text message that you get when you log in to your [bank] 
account. People log on to their account at night, so it should always work. And 
then it is really nice if you get to tell your clients: we are looking at your 
system. This includes all SMS or other products. (Founder 1 TextCo) 
58 
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 Figure 2. Transient and Multidimensional Resource Positions (Perceived) 
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Figure 3. Financial Slack: Firm-Level vs. Perceived Resource Positions (TextCo) 
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Figure 4. Financial Slack: Firm-Level vs. Perceived Resource Positions (SunCo) 
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Figure 5. Financial Slack: Firm-Level vs. Perceived Resource Positions (ChipCo) 
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